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A mixture of propositional dynamic logic and epistemic logic is used to give a formalization
of Artemov’s knowledge based reasoning approach to game theory, (KBR), [4, 5, 6, 7]. We call
the (family of) logics used here PDL + E. It is in the general family of Dynamic Epistemic
Logics [21], was applied to games already in [20], and investigated further in [18, 19]. Epistemic
states of players, usually treated informally in game-theoretic arguments, are here represented
explicitly and reasoned about formally. The heart of the presentation is a detailed analysis of
the Centipede game using both the proof theoretic and the semantic machinery of PDL + E.
The present work can be seen partly as an argument for the thesis that PDL + E should be the
basis of the logical investigation of game theory.
1 Background
Game theory attempts to predict or explain the behavior of agents under tightly specified sequences
of interactions. What agents do commonly depends on their reasoning abilities and their informa-
tion about other agents. An agent may behave one way in an exchange with another agent if the
agent knows the second agent is rational, yet behave differently if the agent doesn’t know that.
Recently in a series of technical reports Sergei Artemov has developed a knowledge-based approach
to games, [4, 5, 6, 7]. (It should be noted that the development is not strictly linear—some things in
earlier reports are overridden in later ones.) Artemov’s work provides new and significant insights.
At the heart of it is the idea that the game tree is only a partial specification of the game—the
epistemic states of the players have a fundamental role, and while conditions on these are generally
stated more informally, they are no less significant. Thus if one assumes common knowledge of
player rationality, or merely mutual knowledge of player rationality, the same game tree may lead
to different outcomes. In this report a formal treatment of game tree + epistemic state machinery
is investigated. In particular there is a semantics in which epistemic states are explicitly present,
and a proof theory is provided for reasoning about them.
Artemov’s presentation is a mixture of formal and informal reasoning. When one asserts that
something is so, an argument using some formalism and some conventional English is appropriate
and convincing. There is a certain amount of hand-waving involved, as there is in most mathematics.
When one asserts that something is not so, one must generally be more careful because informally
presented counter-examples might omit a crucial but overlooked detail. In this report I provide
formal machinery, and apply it formally. This does not mean I advocate that all arguments in this
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area must be formal—it would kill the subject. But it is a truism that a correct mathematical
proof is one that can be formalized, and for this to be applicable, formal machinery must exist. It
is the elaboration of such formal machinery that this report concentrates on, for knowledge based
reasoning applied to game theory.
Dynamic epistemic logic is really an umbrella term covering various combinations of logics of
knowledge and belief with logics of actions. The book [21] has become the standard reference in
this area generally. Nonetheless, the specific variety of dynamic epistemic logic we use here does
not appear in that book. What we need, quite simply, is a straightforward combination of two
very, very traditional logics, propositional dynamic logic, [16, 10] and epistemic logic [12]. This
combination has been considered before, and specifically applied to the analysis of games, in [20].
The approach here is rather different than this, however. In [20], roughly, game states are also
considered to be epistemic states, which is appropriate for the questions investigated there. But
here we are interested in examining Artemov’s knowledge based reasoning ideas, and this leads
us to think of a game state as containing possibly several distinct epistemic states. This provides
flexible machinery suitable for examining player uncertainty even in perfect information games. I
call the (family of) logics used here PDL+E. It is really a family, rather than a single logic, because
on the one hand assumptions of varying strengths can be made concerning player knowledge, and
on the other hand, various ‘cross’ axioms can be assumed as to how the epistemic and the dynamic
operators relate to each other. The interaction axioms were thoroughly investigated in [18, 19],
where axiomatizations, semantics, and completeness proofs can be found (essentially for the one
agent case).
As a case study I apply the machinery in detail to the well-known Centipede game previously
analyzed by Aumann, [8], and discussed again in Artemov’s technical reports (and many other
places, of course). In order to make this report relatively self-contained, I will explain what is
needed from the combination of epistemic and dynamic logics. In particular, completeness results
from [18, 19] will not be needed, only soundness results, and these are straightforward. The game
theory side is a different thing, however, and it is recommended that [4, 5, 6, 7] be consulted for
the motivation behind the knowledge-based approach.
I recognize that this report has a rather forbidding appearance, with many detailed formal
proofs. I apologize for this. The intention is that informal discussions should be read, and the
ontology of the semantics should be grasped, including how epistemic states figure in. Formal
proofs should generally be skipped, or a few spot checked. The existence of formal proofs is
significant, the details of them are not, but proofs are given in full so that a reader may check that
they really do exist and do what is claimed for them.
2 Logics
I begin with a brief discussion of epistemic logic, and a longer one of propositional dynamic logic,
then I discuss their combination, which is much less familiar. I give the combination a name,
PDL + E. The name is slightly misleading since it is really a family of logics, depending on what
epistemic assumptions are made, as well as what assumptions are made concerning the connections
between the dynamic and the epistemic operators. It should be noted again that PDL + E is in the
general family of dynamic epistemic logics [21].
2.1 Epistemic Logic
This is a well-known, standard subject, so I will be brief. There is a set (generally finite but not
necessarily) of agents, A, B, C, . . . . For each agent A there is a modal operator KA, with KAX
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read as: agent A knows X. A dual operator K̂A is sometimes introduced, with K̂AX abbreviating
¬KA¬X. K̂AX can be read as asserting that X is compatible with the knowledge of agent A.
Axiomatically each KA is a normal modal operator, so there is a knowledge necessitation rule,
from X conclude KAX. There are also modus ponens, and the following axiom schemes (note that
these are schemes, not individual axioms).
E-1 All tautologies (or enough schemes to generate them)
E-2 KA(X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (KAX ⊃ KAY )
In addition there may be some or all of the following as axiom schemes.
E-3 KAX ⊃ X, Factivity. Its presence or absence is what distinguishes knowledge from belief,
in this approach.
E-4 KAX ⊃ KAKAX, Positive Introspection.
E-5 ¬KAX ⊃ KA¬KAX, Negative Introspection.
I will explicitly note when any of these three axiom schemes are needed, and will note their absence
if that is significant.
Semantics is the usual Kripke/Hintikka possible world version. A model, then, is a structure
〈G,RA, . . . ,〉, where G is a non-empty set of epistemic states or possible worlds, RA is a binary
relation on G for each agent A, and  is a relation between states and formulas, the “at this state
the formula is true” relation. The  relation meets the usual condition, Γ  KAX iff ∆  X
for every ∆ ∈ G such that ΓRA∆. Factivity for agent A corresponds to requiring that RA be
reflexive, Positive Introspection corresponds to transitivity, and Factivity, Positive Introspection and
Negative Introspection together corresponds to an equivalence relation. Other conditions are often
considered, but they will not be needed here.
2.2 Propositional Dynamic Logic
Propositional dynamic logic (PDL) is a logic of actions, which originally were thought of as corre-
sponding to computer programs, though there is no need to restrict things to this. Informally [α]X
is to be read: after action α is complete then X will be true. Actions can be non-deterministic—
the action ‘go to a store and buy milk’ could be executed in many ways since a choice of store
is unspecified. So to be more precise, [α]X is intended to express that X will be true after α is
executed, no matter how this is done. If α cannot be executed, [α]X is automatically true. The
dual, 〈α〉X, is to be read: there is at least one way of executing action α that leaves X true. If
α cannot be executed 〈α〉X is false. For background and further information about propositional
dynamic logic (PDL), the on-line treatments [1, 9] are recommended. Also strongly recommended
is [11]. Here is a brief summary of PDL, beginning with the language.
There is a collection of actions. Actions are built up from atomic actions (given arbitrarily)
using the following machinery.
• if α and β are actions so is (α;β), representing action α followed by action β.
• if α and β are actions so is (α ∪ β), representing a non-deterministic choice of α or β. This
is sometimes written (α+ β).
• if α is an action so is α∗, representing α repeated an arbitrary number of times, possibly 0.
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• if A is a formula then A? is an action, representing a test for A.
Formulas are built up from atomic formulas in the usual way, with the additional condition: if α
is an action and X is a formula then [α]X and 〈α〉X are formulas. As noted above, [α]X can be
read as: after α is finished, X is true. 〈α〉X will be taken as an abbreviation for ¬[α]¬X.
Incidentally, note the following. One condition above says that if A is a formula then A? is an
action. Another condition says that if α is an action and X is a formula, then [α]X is a formula.
These two together tell us that formulas and actions must be defined by a simultaneous recursion.
The standard axiom system for PDL is as follows. For rules there are modus ponens and action
necessitation, from X conclude [α]X, for any action α. Then there are the following axiom schemes
(again, schemes, not individual axioms).
PDL-1 All tautologies (or enough of them)
PDL-2 [α](X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ ([α]X ⊃ [α]Y )
PDL-3 [α;β]X ≡ [α][β]X
PDL-4 [α ∪ β]X ≡ ([α]X ∧ [β]X)
PDL-5 [α∗]X ≡ (X ∧ [α][α∗]X)
PDL-6 [A?]X ≡ (A ⊃ X)
Finally, a version of induction can be captured by either an axiom scheme or a rule of inference—
they are interderivable. The axiom and rule are as follows.
PDL-7 [α∗](X ⊃ [α]X) ⊃ (X ⊃ [α∗]X)
PDL-8 From X ⊃ [α]X infer X ⊃ [α∗]X
A semantics for PDL amounts to a multi-modal Kripke structure with some additional con-
ditions. A model is a structure 〈G,Rα . . . ,〉 where G is a non-empty set of states (originally,
states in the execution of a program); Rα is a binary accessibility relation between states, for each
action α; and  is a relation between states and formulas. The  relation must satisfy the familiar
Kripkean condition: Γ  [α]X iff ∆  X for every ∆ ∈ G such that ΓRα∆.
The special PDL machinery imposes relationships between the accessibility relations. Specifi-
cally, one requires the following.
• Rα;β is the relation product Rα ◦ Rβ, where Γ(Rα ◦ Rβ)∆ if there is some Ω so that ΓRαΩ
and ΩRβ∆.
• Rα∪β is the relation Rα ∪Rβ.
• ΓRA?Γ just in case Γ  A.
• Rα∗ is the reflexive and transitive closure of Rα (with respect to ◦).
Note that the condition on A? means that  and the family of accessibility relations must be
defined by a mutual recursion.
If there were no ∗ operation, completeness would be simple to prove. With it, the proof is more
complex, and there were incorrect versions proposed. Completeness was first properly established
by Parikh in [15], with another proof along somewhat different lines in [13]. The logic is decidable.
Tableau systems are known.
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2.3 PDL + E
The axiomatics and semantics described in this section come from [18, 19], where more detailed
discussions can be found, for the mono-modal case. A summarization sufficient for present purposes
is given here. In subsequent sections the resulting formal system will be extended by axioms special
to particular games. Not surprisingly, these game axioms will not be axiom schemes, and so the
resulting logics will not be closed under substitution—they will not be normal. This makes for
quite a few difficulties where completeness and decidability are concerned, a primary consideration
of [18, 19], but it is not a relevant issue here. Here logics will not be investigated as such, but rather
their applicability to particular problems is central. Soundness, relative to a semantics having to
do with the game in question, will be easy to establish, and that is all that is needed for present
purposes. The discussion in this section is more general, however, and will narrow down when
particular games are discussed.
To begin, we start with the fusion of the logics from Sections 2.1 and 2.2. Axiomatically
one simply combines all the machinery of epistemic logic with that of PDL. Semantically one
uses possible world models in which there are accessibility relations for each PDL action, and an
accessibility relation for each agent. It is assumed that the PDL relations meet the conditions of
Section 2.2, and each knowledge relation meets the general epistemic conditions of Section 2.1, and
whichever of the reflexive, symmetric, transitive conditions are desired.
In addition, some interaction conditions between the PDL and the epistemic machinery may be
imposed. In [18, 19] three are considered, and these are discussed now.
The first condition is a No Learning condition, given by the following axiom scheme, where i is
any agent.
PDLE-1 [α]KiX ⊃ Ki[α]X (No Learning)
Informally this says that if an agent knows X after an action α is performed, the agent already
knew that X would be true after α, and so executing the action brought no new knowledge.
Semantically, the axiom corresponds to the diagram given in Figure 1. I will say what “cor-
respondence” amounts to more precisely below. The diagram should be read as follows. Assume
there are arbitrary states 1, 3, and 4, with 3 accessible from 1 under the epistemic accessibility
relation associated with Ki, and 4 accessible from 3 under the PDL accessibility relation associated
with action α. Then there is a state 2, accessible from 1 under the PDL relation associated with
α, with 4 accessible from 2 under the epistemic accessibility relation associated with Ki. In short,
given states 1, 3, and 4 meeting the accessibility conditions shown by the two solid arrows, there is
a state 2 with accessibilities shown by the two dashed arrows, so that the diagram commutes.
The next connecting condition is that of Perfect Recall. Axiomatically it is given as follows.
PDLE-2 Ki[α]X ⊃ [α]KiX (Perfect Recall)
The corresponding semantic condition is shown in Figure 2. The diagram is read similarly to the
previous one. If the relations between states 1, 2, and 4 shown by the solid arrows obtain, then
a state 3 must exist with the relations shown by the dashed arrows holding, with the diagram
commuting.
The third condition is called Church-Rosser in [18, 19], but I prefer to call it the Reasoning
Ability condition. Axiomatically it is the following.























Figure 2: Perfect Recall Diagram
Informally this says that if an agent could know X after an action α, the agent is able to figure that
out and so knows now that X could be the case after α. The semantic condition corresponding to
this is given in figure Figure 3.
The exact connections between the three axiomatic conditions given above, and the correspond-
ing semantic conditions, is a bit tricky. Much of it comes down to whether one takes all conditions
as axiom schemes or as particular axioms—equivalently, whether or not there is closure under sub-
stitution. Consider Perfect Recall, PDLE-2, as a representative example. I will assume it not as a
general scheme, but for a particular action α. As such, it is simple to verify that Perfect Recall for
α evaluates to true at every world of any model meeting the Perfect Recall semantic condition for
α. As it happens, this is all that is needed for intended applications. If one takes the axioms as
schemes and asks about completeness issues, things become complicated. It is shown in [18, 19]
that if the epistemic part is strong enough, S5, the PDL+E combination collapses to the PDL part.
It is also shown that the heart of the problem is the PDL notion of test. If one does not have tests,
or if tests are restricted to atomic, this collapse does not happen.
In fact, tests in game formulations will not be used here, and all work will be with particular
versions of the conditions considered above and so there will be no closure under substitution.
Completeness considerations are not important, only soundness ones. And as was noted, these
hold, with routine verifications.











Figure 3: Reasoning Ability Diagram
2.4 Common Knowledge
A common knowledge operator, C, is introduced in one of the usual ways. There is one axiom
scheme and one rule. As is standard, one first adds an ‘everybody knows’ operator: EX abbreviates
KAX ∧KBX ∧KCX ∧ . . .. Here are the common knowledge assumptions.
CK-1 (Axiom Scheme) CX ⊃ E(X ∧ CX)
CK-2 (Rule)
X ⊃ E(Y ∧X)
X ⊃ CY
This particular formulation serves for both common knowledge and common belief. One can
prove CX ⊃ X if agents satisfy Factivity, E-3. Likewise one can prove CCX ⊃ CX with Factivity.
Certain useful items are provable without assumptions of Factivity, Positive Introspection, or Negative
Introspection, and hence apply even to very weak versions of belief. Here are some of them.
The following are provable from CK-1 and CK-2.
Com-1 E(X ∧ CX) ⊃ CX
Com-2 CX ⊃ CCX
Com-3 CX ⊃ CEX
Com-4 CX ⊃ CKiX
Com-5 C(X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (CX ⊃ CY )
Com-6 Necessitation, from X conclude CX
In addition there are connections with some of the special assumptions given earlier in this section.
These are now discussed.
Proposition 2.1 Assume each agent satisfies Reasoning Ability, PDLE-3, using action α. Then
analogous results hold for E and C, specifically one has the following.
1. 〈α〉EX ⊃ E〈α〉X
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2. 〈α〉CX ⊃ C〈α〉X
Proof We give the proof for two agents. The extension to more is obvious. For item 1,
〈α〉EX ⊃ 〈α〉[KAX ∧KBX]
⊃ [〈α〉KAX ∧ 〈α〉KBX]
⊃ [KA〈α〉X ∧KB〈α〉X]
⊃ E〈α〉X
For item 2, using both the axiom and rule for common knowledge,
CX ⊃ E(X ∧ CX)
〈α〉CX ⊃ 〈α〉E(X ∧ CX)
⊃ E〈α〉(X ∧ CX)
⊃ E[〈α〉X ∧ 〈α〉CX]
〈α〉CX ⊃ C〈α〉X
A similar result holds for No Learning, PDLE-1. I state it and omit the proof.
Proposition 2.2 Assume each agent satisfies No Learning, PDLE-1 for action α. Then analogous
results hold for E and C, specifically one has the following.
1. [α]EX ⊃ E[α]X
2. [α]CX ⊃ C[α]X
Perfect Recall is more of a problem. There is the following.
Proposition 2.3 Assume each agent satisfies Perfect Recall, PDLE-2 for action α. Then we have
En[α]X ⊃ [α]EnX, and also C[α]X ⊃ [α]EnX, for every n.
Proof Again the proof is given for two agents, to keep things simple. The argument is by induction,
and only the first item will be proved.
The base case, n = 0, is trivial. The induction step is as follows.
En+1[α]X ⊃ En{KA[α]X ∧KB[α]X}





The analogous result for common knowledge does not seem to follow (though I have no proof of
this). En suffices for results about particular finite games, but for results about families of games
one needs C and so, when appropriate, I will assume the following as an additional condition.
CK-3 C[α]X ⊃ [α]CX (Extended Perfect Recall)
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3 PDL + E For Games
In this section I give axioms general enough to apply to many games. Semantics comes later, in
Section 5. Following Artemov, [4, 5, 6, 7], Knowledge of the Game Tree includes possible moves,
payoffs, etc., all of which should be common knowledge. I leave issues of payoffs until later, and
concentrate initially on what might be called ‘general structure.’ To this end I adopt some specific
axioms—these are not axiom schemes since they refer to particular players. It is assumed that our
necessitation rules apply to these axioms, necessitation both for knowledge operators and for action
operators.
3.1 General Game Tree Knowledge
Games can have any number of players. The ones of interest here have two, and so things are
formulated for this situation only. Generalizations are obvious, but the assumption of two players
keeps notation simpler. I designate two special propositional letters, A and B, with the intended
meaning that A is true if it is the turn of agent A to move, and B is true if it is the turn of agent
B to move. I also assume there are knowledge operators (and their duals) for each agent, KA and
KB. In addition to general PDL + E axioms and rules there are the following axioms (again, not
axiom schemes). They say that exactly one player is to move, and everybody knows whose move it
is. They are in a family of axioms representing knowledge of the game; accordingly I number these
axioms in a KG sequence.
KG-1 A ∨B
KG-2 ¬(A ∧B)
KG-3 A ⊃ KAA
KG-4 B ⊃ KBB
KG-5 A ⊃ KBA
KG-6 B ⊃ KAB
An aside: it is possible at this point to introduce a defined operator K with the intended
meaning of KX being: the player whose turn it is to move knows X. More formally, KX ≡ ((A ⊃
KAX)∧(B ⊃ KBX)). I will not make use of this defined operator here, but it is interesting to note
that K has almost all the properties of a normal modal operator. There is no closure of theorems
involving it under substitution, since I have given propositional letters A and B special roles, and
this is obviously not preserved under substitution. Nonetheless there is the following, whose proof
is omitted.
Theorem 3.1 The following are provable using the axioms, rules, and definitions introduced so
far.
1. K(X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (KX ⊃ KY ) is a theorem.
2. If X is a theorem, so is KX.
3. If E-3, Factivity, holds for both KA and KB then it holds for K; KX ⊃ X.
4. if E-4, Positive Introspection, holds for both KA and KB then it holds for K; KX ⊃ KXX.
10 Melvin Fitting
5. If E-5, Negative Introspection, holds for both KA and KB then it holds for K; ¬KX ⊃ K¬KX.
This ends the side remarks, and I now continue with general game tree considerations. In a
game each player has a choice of moves, say these are represented by propositional letters m1, m2,
. . . , mk. At each turn the appropriate player picks exactly one move, so there are the following
minimal assumptions about moves.
KG-7 m1 ∨m2 ∨ . . . ∨mk
KG-8 ¬(m1 ∧m2), ¬(m1 ∧m3), ¬(m2 ∧m3), . . .
Each mi represents a decision by a player. In addition there are transitions from one state
of the game to another state. Some choices by players end the game, some choices trigger these
transitions. In this report transitions are dynamic operators, distinct from any of the mi, though
there is certainly a connection between player choices and transitions—choices that do not end play
trigger transitions. Let us assume α1, α2, . . . , αn are the atomic transitions available, represented
by atomic dynamic operators.
It is assumed players alternate, and so a transition to a new active state of the game switches
the player whose turn it is to move. For each game transition αi I assume the following.
KG-9 A ⊃ [αi]B
KG-10 B ⊃ [αi]A
Some game states are terminal in the sense that players can choose plays, but all plays end
the game—no transitions to further states are possible. We will use this terminology throughout,
referring to a game state as terminal, or not. It is assumed players know which states are the
terminal ones. More generally, I assume that for each atomic transition αi, each player knows if
transition αi is possible or not. If no transition is possible at a state, the state is terminal. This is
easily represented. The formula 〈αi〉> asserts that an αi transition is possible (> is truth), while
the formula [αi]⊥, equivalently ¬〈αi〉>, asserts that an αi transition is impossible (⊥ is falsehood).
Likewise 〈α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn〉> asserts that some atomic transition is possible, while [α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn]⊥
asserts that no atomic transition can be made—one is at a terminal game state. I assume the
following, for each atomic game transition αi.
KG-11 [αi]⊥ ⊃ KA[αi]⊥
KG-12 [αi]⊥ ⊃ KB[αi]⊥
KG-13 〈αi〉> ⊃ KA〈αi〉>
KG-14 〈αi〉> ⊃ KB〈αi〉>
Incidentally, KG-11 and KG-12 follow easily from the No Learning condition, PDLE-1, and KG-13
and KG-14 likewise follow from the Reasoning Ability condition, PDLE-3. Since one doesn’t always
want to assume these powerful conditions, it is reasonable to make them separate assumptions.
Proposition 3.2 The following are provable.
1. [α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn]⊥ ⊃ KA[α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn]⊥
2. [α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn]⊥ ⊃ KB[α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn]⊥
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3. 〈α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn〉> ⊃ KA〈α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn〉>
4. 〈α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn〉> ⊃ KB〈α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn〉>
Proof For item 1 (item 2 is similar)
[α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn]⊥ ≡ [α1]⊥ ∧ . . . ∧ [αn]⊥
⊃ KA[α1]⊥ ∧ . . . ∧KA[αn]⊥
≡ KA([α1]⊥ ∧ . . . ∧ [αn]⊥)
≡ KA[α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn]⊥
Next for item 3 (item 4 is similar)
〈α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn〉⊥ ≡ 〈α1〉⊥ ∨ . . . ∨ 〈αn〉⊥
⊃ KA〈α1〉⊥ ∨ . . . ∨KA〈αn〉⊥
⊃ KA(〈α1〉⊥ ∨ . . . ∨ 〈αn〉⊥)
≡ KA〈α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn〉⊥
3.2 Rationality Considerations
The last of our general game principles is the only one that is essentially non-trivial. While it
appears in one form or another in the works of a number of authors, it was given special emphasis
in [4, 5, 6, 7]. Loosely it says that a player who is rational and who knows what his or her best move
is, given the limitations imposed by the knowledge the player possesses, will play that best move.
This, of course, presupposes that such best moves must exist. In fact Artemov has shown that,
under very broad conditions, each player in a game, when it is his turn to move, must have a move
that is best possible given what the player knows at that point of the game. This is called the best
known move, and is represented formally by a propositional letter. Suggestively, this propositional
letter is written in a special format, for example kbestA(m) which is intended to express that move m
is the best known move for player A. Rationality for a player is also represented by a propositional
letter, and again suggestive notation is used: raA or raB, for rationality of A or B respectively. The
fundamental rationality conditions assert that a player who is rational and is aware of what his or
her best known move is, will play it. Here is the formal version of these rationality conditions, for
each move mi.
RC-A (A ∧KAkbestA(mi) ∧ raA) ⊃ mi
RC-B (B ∧KBkbestB(mi) ∧ raB) ⊃ mi
3.3 Backward Induction
So-called backward induction plays a central role in the analysis of a number of games. In this
section I give a schematic version of backward induction, using the machinery introduced so far.
This version is quite straightforward, but will serve to simplify some of the arguments later on.
Roughly, backward induction shows something, say X, is true throughout a game by showing X is
true at terminal game states, and also showing X is true at a state provided some transition from
that state takes the game to another state at which X is true. Thus one works backward from
terminal states to encompass the entire game tree.
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Theorem 3.3 (Backward Induction Derived Rule) Let α1, . . . , αn be all the atomic game
transitions, and let X be some formula. Assume the following.
1. 〈(α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn)∗〉[α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn]⊥
2. [α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn]⊥ ⊃ X
3. 〈α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn〉X ⊃ X
Then X follows.
Before giving the simple proof some comments are in order since PDL formulas are not easy
to read until some experience has been gained. I noted earlier that [α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn]⊥ asserts one is
at a terminal game state—every atomic transition is impossible. Then condition 1 of the theorem
asserts that one can always reach a terminal state through some sequence of atomic transitions.
Likewise condition 2 asserts that the formula X is true at terminal states. And finally condition 3
asserts that if some atomic transition takes us to a state at which X is true, then X is true at the
original state. These are the conditions for backward induction, stated less formally earlier.
Proof By condition 3, ¬X ⊃ [α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn]¬X. Then by the rule of inference PDL-8, we have
¬X ⊃ [(α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn)∗]¬X. By standard modal reasoning, and using condition 2, we have the
following.
[(α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn)∗]¬X ∧ 〈(α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn)∗〉[α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn]⊥
⊃ 〈(α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn)∗〉 (¬X ∧ [α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn]⊥)
⊃ 〈(α1 ∪ . . . ∪ αn)∗〉(¬X ∧X)
⊃ ⊥
Then using condition 1 we have [(α1 ∪ . . .∪αn)∗]¬X ⊃ ⊥ which combines with the result above to
give us ¬X ⊃ ⊥, or X.
4 Formal PDL + E Proofs
Payoffs have not entered into the discussion so far. These are not formalized directly in our
formal logic. It can be complicated mixing a complex propositional modal logic with elementary
arithmetic. Instead I assume payoffs induce general strategy principles which vary from game to
game, and I attempt to formulate these strategy principles using the PDL+E machinery introduced
so far. For this it is simplest to discuss specific games, and so I turn to the well-known Centipede
game. I begin with a standard presentation, giving the extensive form diagram and an informal
analysis. The usual conclusion is that if there is common knowledge of player rationality, the first
move in the game will be down. Not surprisingly, this will come out of the present formalization
too, but the analysis of Centipede is only part of the point here. I present a methodology that
I believe will be applicable to other games as well; consequently I proceed in gradual stages to
make the presentation as transparent as possible. Only axiomatic proofs are considered in this
section—semantics is reserved for Section 5.
4.1 The Centipede Game Tree
Figure 4 displays the extensive form diagram for a five-move version of the Centipede game, a
game which in its 100 move version first appeared in [17]. Play starts at the upper left, alternating
between A and B. Each player can choose to move right or move down. Payoffs shown are for A
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and B in that order. The payoffs are arranged so that if a player does not terminate the game
(by moving down), and the other player ends the game on the next move, the first player receives
a little less than if that player had simply terminated the game directly. There are many ways
payoffs can be arranged to meet this condition. We have used a common version: at each move the
payoffs are switched around, and 2 is added to second payoff number.




A B A B A
2, 1 1, 4 4, 3
?
3, 6 6, 5
5, 8
Figure 4: Five-Move Centipede
It is important to point out that the game tree displayed does not take knowledge into consid-
eration. Nowhere is it represented that agent A knows, or does not know, that B is rational, for
instance. It can be seen as a kind of PDL model in which transitions to the right are shown, taking
players from one game state to another. But without any explicit representation of knowledge, it
is not in any sense a model for PDL + E. I postpone the semantic introduction of epistemic states,
and work entirely proof-theoretically for this section.
It is clear that the game presented in Figure 4 is intended to be one of a family—the pattern
can be continued to arbitrary length. As given in [4] the analysis is tailored to the specific five
move game, though it is obvious that the ideas generalize. At first glance a direct generalization
would seem to involve a formal logic of knowledge and an induction, applied from the outside of
the logic. The machinery of PDL allows us to carry this out inside our formal system, and so our
analysis will apply to Centipede of any length.
One can reason informally about the game, as follows. If the game were to start at the right-
hand node, it is obvious that A is best off moving down, so if A is rational, the move will be down.
If the game were to start at the node second from the right, B could reason as follows: at the next
node, if A is rational the move will be down; so I am better off moving down right now since I will
get 6 instead of 5. Therefore, at this node, if B is rational and if B knows A is rational, B will
move down. This reasoning can be repeated, as a backward induction, leading to the conclusion
that if the rationality of everybody is common knowledge (or at least sufficiently so), then A will
move down at the start.
4.2 Centipede Game Tree Knowledge
There are two players, A and B, and axioms KG-1 – KG-6 from Section 3.1 are directly adopted,
but are relabeled KGcent-1 – KGcent-6 to be uniform with axioms introduced below. At each node
one of two moves can be selected by a player, right and down. Instead of m1 and m2, I represent
these more suggestively by ri and do. Then KG-7 and KG-8 specialize to the following.
KGcent-7 ri ∨ do
KGcent-8 ¬(ri ∧ do)
Continuing, one needs to say what atomic transitions there are in the Centipede game. In fact
there is only one, which I denote by R, representing a transition to the next active node to the
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right. R is an atomic action in PDL + E. For convenience I repeat the Centipede game tree in
Figure 5, with some of the labels changed. I have suppressed player information and inserted node
labels (positive integers) to make it easier to discuss things. I have also added explicit transition
labels, R.




1 2 3 4 5
2, 1 1, 4 4, 3
?
3, 6 6, 5
5, 8
Figure 5: Five-Move Centipede, Again
Now KG-9 and KG-10 specialize to the following.
KGcent-9 A ⊃ [R]B
KGcent-10 B ⊃ [R]A
In a similar way KG-11 – KG-14 specialize to the following.
KGcent-11 [R]⊥ ⊃ KA[R]⊥
KGcent-12 [R]⊥ ⊃ KB[R]⊥
KGcent-13 〈R〉> ⊃ KA〈R〉>
KGcent-14 〈R〉> ⊃ KB〈R〉>
There is one more axiom to be stated, whose importance turns out to be fundamental. In
Figure 5 it is obvious that no matter at which of the five nodes one is, a sequence of transitions is
possible that will take one to node 5, the terminal state, namely a sequence of moves to the right.
Recall, the Centipede game displayed is one of many, since the length need not be 5 but could be
anything. An axiom is needed to cover the general situation—a terminal state is always possible
to reach.
KGcent-15 〈R∗〉[R]⊥
4.3 Rationality and Strategy Considerations
General rationality conditions were stated in Section 3.2 as RC-A and RC-B. These now specialize
as follows.
RCcent-A (A ∧KAkbestA(do) ∧ raA) ⊃ do
(A ∧KAkbestA(ri) ∧ raA) ⊃ ri
RCcent-B (B ∧KBkbestB(do) ∧ raB) ⊃ do
(B ∧KBkbestB(ri) ∧ raB) ⊃ ri
I also assume that players do not abruptly become irrational, rationality persists.
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RPcent-A raA ⊃ [R]raA
RPcent-B raB ⊃ [R]raB
Next I turn to issues of strategy. The logical machinery that has been introduced is inadequate
to represent numerical payoffs. Rather than expanding this machinery, I extract from the game
formulation general statements that follow from the payoff information, but that can be formulated
using the machinery that has been introduced.
For the Centipede game I have been displaying a five-move version, but in fact the game could
be of any length and certain strategy assumptions would still apply. The first pair of conditions
stated below say that if the game has reached the terminal node (node 5 in Figure 5), down is the
best move for the player whose turn it is to play, and this is obvious so it is also the best known
move. In the five-move game the last player to play is A, but could be either depending on the
length of the game. Recall that [R]⊥ distinguishes the terminal node in the Centipede game. I call
these endgame strategy axioms.
EScent-A A ⊃ ([R]⊥ ⊃ kbestA(do))
EScent-B B ⊃ ([R]⊥ ⊃ kbestB(do))
The final conditions I call midgame strategy axioms. These conditions apply to the cases where
play is not at the terminal node, and so a transition to the right is possible, after which there is
still at least one more move. A quick inspection of Figure 4 shows that at any non-terminal node,
N , if the play is right and then down, the player whose turn it is to play at node N will receive
less than would be the case if down were played directly. So if the player whose turn it is at node
N somehow knows that a play of down might be made if he plays right, then the player’s known
best move at N is down. Likewise if the play is right and then right, the player whose turn it is to
play will receive more, no matter how the play goes afterward, than would be the case if he played
down. So if the player whose turn it is at node N knows that a move of right must be made if he
moves right, then right is his known best move at N . This is the content of the next two axioms.
MScent-A A ⊃ (KA〈R〉do ⊃ kbestA(do))
(A ∧ 〈R〉>) ⊃ (KA[R]ri ⊃ kbestA(ri))
MScent-B B ⊃ (KB〈R〉do ⊃ kbestB(do))
(B ∧ 〈R〉>) ⊃ (KB[R]ri ⊃ kbestB(ri))
A remark about the two axioms having to do with moves to the right. A ‘pre-condition’ of 〈R〉>
is included because [R]ri is trivially true at a terminal node, but the conclusions of the two axioms
conflict with those of EScent-A and EScent-B. The present axioms are meant to be applicable at
midgame nodes only, and the presence of 〈R〉> restricts things to these nodes. There isn’t a
corresponding condition in the two axioms having to do with moves down because it isn’t needed.
〈R〉do implies 〈R〉> and so, within a knowledge condition, terminal nodes are implicitly ruled out.
4.4 Proofs
Let ra abbreviate raA ∧ raB, so that ra is a general rationality assertion. The entire of this section
is a formal proof, for Centipede of any length, of Cra ⊃ Cdo, which says that if it is common
knowledge that both players are rational, then it is common knowledge that the move is down.
The assumptions that will be used in this section are the following:
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• The general PDL + E axiom schemes and rules from Section 2.3
• The Centipede game tree knowledge axioms KGcent-1 – KGcent-15 from Section 4.2
• The Centipede rationality and strategy axioms RCcent-A, RCcent-B, RPcent-A, RPcent-B,
EScent-A, EScent-B, MScent-A, and MScent-B, all from Section 4.3
In addition to these general assumptions, I will be explicit about whether and where E-3, Factivity,
E-4, Positive Introspection, and E-5, Negative Introspection are used epistemically—in fact, rather
remarkably, they are not needed at all. I will be similarly explicit about the cross-conditions PDLE-
1, No Learning, PDLE-2, Perfect Recall, PDLE-3, Reasoning Ability, and CK-3, Extended Perfect Recall,
some of which do play a role.
The general plan in this section is to establish results that will allow us to apply the Backward
Induction Derived Rule, Theorem 3.3. Our first result says that if the game is at a terminal node,
and both players are rational, the move will be down. In fact, it is enough for the player whose
turn it is to move to be rational, but the stronger hypothesis will certainly do no harm. It follows
easily that this result is common knowledge. In giving proofs I assume standard modal reasoning
is familiar, and omit steps involving it.
Proposition 4.1 [R]⊥ ⊃ (ra ⊃ do), and hence also [R]⊥ ⊃ (Cra ⊃ Cdo).
Proof
A ⊃ ([R]⊥ ⊃ kbestA(do)) EScent-A
KAA ⊃ (KA[R]⊥ ⊃ KAkbestA(do))
A ⊃ ([R]⊥ ⊃ KAkbestA(do)) KG-3, KGcent-11
A ⊃ ((ra ∧ [R]⊥) ⊃ (ra ∧KAkbestA(do)))
A ⊃ ((ra ∧ [R]⊥) ⊃ do) RCcent-A
Similarly we show (B ⊃ ((ra ∧ [R]⊥) ⊃ do). Now (ra ∧ [R]⊥) ⊃ do), and hence [R]⊥ ⊃ (ra ⊃ do)
follow using KGcent-1, identical to KG-1.
For the second part, from what was just proved we have C[R]⊥ ⊃ (Cra ⊃ Cdo), so it is enough
to show [R]⊥ ⊃ C[R]⊥. Now, by KGcent-11 we have [R]⊥ ⊃ KA[R]⊥ and from KGcent-12 we have
[R]⊥ ⊃ KB[R]⊥, and so also [R]⊥ ⊃ E[R]⊥. Then [R]⊥ ⊃ C[R]⊥ follows by rule CK-2.
The next item says that if the game is at an intermediate node, everybody is rational, and it is
common knowledge that after a transition right the next move might be down, then a down move
will be made. Again it is enough for the player whose turn it is to play to be rational, and this is
proved first.
Lemma 4.2 The following are provable.
1. (A ∧ raA ∧ C〈R〉do) ⊃ do
2. (B ∧ raB ∧ C〈R〉do) ⊃ do
3. (ra ∧ C〈R〉do) ⊃ do
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Proof
(A ∧KA〈R〉do) ⊃ kbestA(do) MScent-A
(CA ∧ CKA〈R〉do) ⊃ CkbestA(do)
(CA ∧ C〈R〉do) ⊃ CkbestA(do) Com-4
(CA ∧ C〈R〉do) ⊃ KAkbestA(do)
(A ∧ C〈R〉do) ⊃ KAkbestA(do) KG-3
⊃ (A ∧KAkbestA(do))
(A ∧ raA ∧ C〈R〉do) ⊃ (A ∧ raA ∧KAkbestA(do))
⊃ do RCcent-A
In a similar way we prove (B ∧ raB ∧ C〈R〉do) ⊃ do. Then (ra ∧ C〈R〉do) ⊃ do follows using the
definition of ra, and KGcent-1, identical to KG-1.
Next, a few utility items.
Lemma 4.3
1. Assume CK-3, Extended Perfect Recall. Then Cra ⊃ [R]Cra.
2. Assume PDLE-3, Reasoning Ability. Then Cra ⊃ (〈R〉Cdo ⊃ Cdo).
Proof For part 1,
ra ⊃ [R]ra RPcent-A, RPcent-B
Cra ⊃ C[R]ra
⊃ [R]Cra CK-3
And for part 2,
C〈R〉do ⊃ (ra ⊃ do) Lemma 4.2
CC〈R〉do ⊃ C(ra ⊃ do)
C〈R〉do ⊃ C(ra ⊃ do) Com-2
〈R〉Cdo ⊃ C(ra ⊃ do) Proposition 2.1
⊃ (Cra ⊃ Cdo)
Cra ⊃ (〈R〉Cdo ⊃ Cdo)
And now what amounts to the induction step of Backwards Induction.
Proposition 4.4 Assume CK-3, Extended Perfect Recall, and PDLE-3, Reasoning Ability. Then
〈R〉(Cra ⊃ Cdo) ⊃ (Cra ⊃ Cdo).
Proof
〈R〉(Cra ⊃ Cdo) ≡ 〈R〉(¬Cra ∨ Cdo)
≡ 〈R〉¬Cra ∨ 〈R〉Cdo
≡ ¬[R]Cra ∨ 〈R〉Cdo
⊃ ¬Cra ∨ 〈R〉Cdo Lemma 4.3, part 1
≡ Cra ⊃ 〈R〉Cdo
⊃ Cra ⊃ Cdo Lemma 4.3, part 2
Finally, the result we have been aiming at.
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Theorem 4.5 Assume CK-3, Extended Perfect Recall, and PDLE-3, Reasoning Ability. Then Cra ⊃
Cdo.
Proof Axiom KGcent-15 says 〈R∗〉[R]⊥. Proposition 4.1 says [R]⊥ ⊃ (Cra ⊃ Cdo). And Proposi-
tion 4.4 says 〈R〉(Cra ⊃ Cdo) ⊃ (Cra ⊃ Cdo). Since R is the only atomic transition, Theorem 3.3
immediately yields Cra ⊃ Cdo.
It is worth noting that E-3, Factivity, E-4, Positive Introspection, and E-5, Negative Introspection,
were not used in any proof of this section. In particular, this means the result holds under the
assumption that one is modeling player belief rather than player knowledge. This should not be
surprising. After all, play is based on what one believes to be the case—what the full situation
‘actually’ is may be unobtainable. Further, no introspection of any kind is needed by players, which
is somewhat curious given the standard assumption of S5 knowledge. Also PDLE-1, No Learning,
was not used, but this is of lesser significance.
5 PDL + E Semantics
I have noted several times that extensive form game trees have no machinery to keep track of
what players know or do not know at various states. It is time to bring this in. Whimsically
expressed, the idea is that one can envision the nodes of a game tree not as featureless dots, but
as containing (while concealing) the epistemic states of the players. These epistemic states will
be represented by Hintikka-style possible world models—that is, we use the semantic machinery
discussed in Section 2.3.
Throughout the rest of this report the following terminology will be systematically used. Game
nodes or game states are the nodes seen in the usual extensive form game diagrams. Epistemic
states are possible worlds in the usual Hintikka/Kripke epistemic sense. Each game node has
associated with it an epistemic model, and we refer to the epistemic states of this model as being
of or in the game node. A game tree with its epistemic states displayed will be referred to as an
augmented game tree.
5.1 Augmented Game Tree Examples
Suppose that somewhere in a game tree one has the fragment shown in Figure 6. In it two game
nodes are shown, though presumably there are others as well. On the left A is to play, on the right
B, and there is a transition α, from left to right.
- - -
Az Bzα
Figure 6: Game Tree Fragment, GTF
Suppose that at the left node A has no uncertainty—for every formula Z either KAZ or KA¬Z.
Suppose also that at the right node B is uncertain of the status of some proposition P . In Figure 7
I have expanded the ‘dots’ of Figure 6 to reflect these conditions. In this augmented game tree the
left game node contains one epistemic state and the right two. On the left I have only displayed
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things appropriate to A, the player to move at this state, and on the right I have only displayed
things appropriate to B. More could be shown, but it makes things hard to read and is not relevant
for this example. It is assumed that the epistemic state of the left game node is accessible from
itself, with respect to A’s accessibility relation, and for the right game node the two epistemic states
are mutually accessible, including from themselves, with respect to B’s accessibility relation. (That
is, S5 knowledge is assumed in both cases.) In one of B’s epistemic states P is true, and in one P
is false, reflecting the uncertainty B has concerning P . The lack of uncertainty possessed by A is








Figure 7: GTF, First Epistemic Augmentation
Note that there are two transition arrows labeled α in Figure 7. This does not mean two different
moves are available from the left game node, both called α. Rather, one move α is available, but
there is some question about what epistemic state we will find B in after the move is made.
I now follow the rules for evaluation of formulas at states, as discussed in Section 2. At both of
the epistemic states for B in the right game node, KBP is false, since there is an epistemic state
in which P itself is false, and hence B does not know P . Likewise KB¬P is also false in both
states. Hence at both states of the right game node we have ¬KBP and ¬KB¬P . Then since
all α transitions from the single epistemic state in the left node lead to states in which both of
these formulas are true, in the epistemic state of the left game node we have the truth of [α]¬KBP
and [α]¬KB¬P . And since there is only one epistemic state for A in the left game node, we have
KA[α]¬KBP and KA[α]¬KB¬P both true at it. On the other hand, we also have 〈α〉P and 〈α〉¬P
true at the epistemic state in the left game node, and hence also KA〈α〉P and KA〈α〉¬P .
Stating things more colloquially, at the epistemic state in the left game node A knows that a
transition of α could leave P true or could leave it false, and so A is uncertain of the effect of the
transition on P . But also A knows that after a transition of α, B will likewise be uncertain about
P .
Figure 8 shows a modification of Figure 7, one of the transition arrows is missing. In this, at
the epistemic state in the left game node, it is still the case that KA[α]¬KBP and KA[α]¬KB¬P ,






Figure 8: GTF, Second Epistemic Augmentation
For the third and last of our simple examples, Figure 9 shows the game tree fragment of
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Figure 6, but augmented with different epistemic states. This time the right game node contains
three epistemic states for B, with the top two mutually accessible, and the bottom one not accessible
from either of the top two. (I state these accessibility conditions in words to keep the diagrams
from getting too complicated.) At both of the top two epistemic states for B, ¬KBP is true, while
at the bottom one KBP is true. I leave it to you to check that at the epistemic state in the left












Figure 9: GTF, Third Epistemic Augmentation
5.2 Centipede Augmented
The examples discussed in Section 5.1 are not related to any particular game of interest. They
are based on the game tree fragment of Figure 6, which is quite generic. Now things become
very specific indeed—I make use of semantic machinery to prove that, in Theorem 4.5, common
knowledge of rationality is essential. To this end I give an augmented version of Centipede, but to
keep things relatively simple I use a three-move version of the game, as shown in Figure 10. Of





2, 1 1, 4 4, 3
3, 6
Figure 10: Three-Move Centipede
An augmented version of this game is shown in Figure 11, with epistemic states shown for both
players. Since the diagram is rather complicated, I explain how to read it. First, the three game
nodes of Figure 10 are expanded, and labeled G1, G2, and G3. Each game node now has internal
structure, each with three epistemic states labeled E1, E2, and E3. I will, in effect, use coordinates
to refer to particular epistemic states, as in (G1, E3) for game node G1, epistemic state E3, for
instance. The epistemic states for each game node have accessibility relations defined on them, for
each player. These are represented by ellipses, and happen to be the same for each game node.
Thus, epistemic state E1 is related only to itself for B. Epistemic states E1 and E2 are related to
each other and to themselves for A. Similarly E2 and E3 are related to each other and to themselves
for B. And finally, E3 is related only to itself for A. The accessibility relations for each player, at
each game state, are equivalence relations, and hence S5 knowledge is assumed for each player.
Transitions to the right are shown by arrows. It is left to the reader to check in detail that
the diagram satisfies all the conditions discussed in Section 2.3, No Learning, Perfect Recall, and
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Figure 11: An Augmented Three-Move Centipede
Reasoning Ability, for each player. For instance, for player A there is an epistemic arrow from (G1,
E1) to (G1, E2), and a game arrow from (G1, E2) to (G2, E2). (Epistemic accessibility is an
equivalence relation, so states that are related have accessibility arrows in both directions.) But
there is also a game arrow from (G1, E1) to (G2, E1) and an epistemic arrow from (G2, E1) to
(G2, E2), filling out the square shown in Figure 1 for the No Learning condition. Many cases must
be checked, but verifying No Learning, Perfect Recall, and Reasoning Ability is straightforward.
At each epistemic state truth or falsity for various atomic propositions is shown. For instance,
at epistemic state (G1, E1), raA and raB are both true, both players are rational at this state. Also
do is false, that is, player A does not choose to move down. Finally kbestA(do) is also false. It is
easy to verify that at this state A knows the rationality of both A and B, as does B, but A does
not know that B knows A is rational. This latter is the case because, at epistemic state (G1, E3)
A is not rational; B cannot distinguish between (G1, E2) and (G1, E3) so at (G1, E2) B does not
know A is rational, and A cannot distinguish between (G1, E1) and (G1, E2), so at (G1, E1) A
does not know that B knows A is rational.
It is implicitly assumed that the propositional letter A is true at each of the three epistemic
states of G1, that B is true at each epistemic state of G2, and that A is true at each epistemic
state of G3. It follows easily that each of the axioms KGcent-1 through KGcent-6 is true at each of
the nine epistemic states of the model, or as I will more simply say, these axioms are valid in the
model.
It is also assumed that ri is true at exactly the epistemic nodes where ¬do is displayed. It
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follows that both of the axioms KGcent-7 and KGcent-8 are valid in the model.
Each of the arrows shown is implicitly labeled R, and validity of axioms KGcent-9 through
KGcent-15 is easily checked.
It is assumed in the diagram that kbestA(ri) is true at exactly the nodes at which kbestA(do) is
false, and similarly for kbestB(ri). It follows that each of RCcent-A and RCcent-B is valid. Consider,
for example, (A ∧KAkbestA(do) ∧ raA) ⊃ do. It is true at each of (G3, E1) and (G3, E2) because
do is true, and at (G3, E3) because raA is false. It is true at each of (G2, E1), (G2, E2) and (G2,
E3) because A is false at each. And it is true at each of (G1, E1), (G1, E2) and (G1, E3) because
KAkbestA(do) is false. I leave it to the reader to check validity for the other three axioms.
Axioms RPcent-A and RPcent-B are easily seen to be valid, as are EScent-A and EScent-B.
Finally there are axioms MScent-A and MScent-B. At all epistemic states of G3 MScent-A is true
because 〈R〉do is false and hence so is KA〈R〉do. At all epistemic states of G2 MScent-A is trivially
true because A is false. Finally we consider G1. At state (G1, E2) 〈R〉do is false, because do is
false at (G2, E2), and so KA〈R〉do is false at both epistemic states (G1, E1) and (G1, E2), which
are indistinguishable for A. Likewise 〈R〉do is false at (G1, E3) because do is false at (G2, E3), and
so KA〈R〉do is false at (G1, E3). It follows that MScent-A is true at the three epistemic states of
G1, and hence is valid in the model. Validity of MScent-B is checked similarly.
Thus every axiom for Centipede, given in Section 4.2, is valid in the model of Figure 11, as
are the No Learning, Perfect Recall, and Reasoning Ability conditions from Section 2.3. In addition,
since all epistemic accessibility relations are equivalence relations, Factivity, Positive Introspection,
and Negative Introspection are valid for both players.
Now let us concentrate on epistemic node (G1, E1). Cra is not true at this epistemic state
because if it were, ra would have to be true at every epistemic state reachable from here, but
raA is not true at the reachable node (G1, E3). On the other hand, Era is true at (G1, E1)—this
abbreviates a formula equivalent to KAraA∧KAraB∧KBraA∧KBraB and expresses that everybody
knows that all players are rational. At (G1, E1) raA and raB are true, and hence so are KBraA
and KBraB. Likewise raA and raB are true at both (G1, E1) and (G1, E2), and hence KAraA and
KAraB are true at (G1, E1). Since do is not true at (G1, E1), this establishes that Era ⊃ do is not
derivable from our axioms for Centipede, together with additional strong knowledge assumptions.
6 One More Example
I conclude with one more Centipede-based example, in which the game tree is the same but the
epistemic assumptions are substantially different They are asymmetric—the two players are not
interchangeable, so to speak.
6.1 Irrational Play
Theorem 4.5 concludes that, in Centipede, play will be down provided rationality of players is
common knowledge. What does it mean to be rational? I have taken an essentially operational view
here, though the wording sometimes obscures this. Axioms RC-A and RC-B are really necessary
conditions for a play to be rational—a rational move must be in accordance with what is most
advantageous to the player, within the limits of what the player knows at the moment of play.
Rationality is not treated as a predisposition or psychological state; rather it is moves of the player
that are rational. In effect, then, a player is rational if the player only makes rational moves.
Then our game axioms RCcent-A and RCcent-B, combined with axioms RPcent-A and RPcent-B,
amount to rationality assumptions about players—from them it follows that rational play at the
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start yields rational play throughout, and one can identify rational play throughout with rationality
of the player.
I now want to consider irrational play—moves that are not in the best interests of the player.
I add two new axioms, counterparts of RC-A and RC-B. For each move mi of a game, I assume the
following irrationality conditions.
IC-A (A ∧KAkbestA(mi) ∧ ¬raA) ⊃ ¬mi
IC-B (B ∧KBkbestA(mi) ∧ ¬raB) ⊃ ¬mi
Briefly, a player plays irrationally if the player does not choose the known best move. Note that
these axioms, combined with RC-A and RC-B, give us simple equivalence versions.
• (A ∧KAkbestA(mi)) ⊃ (raA ≡ mi)
• (B ∧KBkbestA(mi)) ⊃ (raB ≡ mi)
In investigating strategy, rationality or irrationality is not really what is important. Rather
it is what players know about these things that matters. And for this there are three, not two,
possibilities. A player might know another player is rational, or he might know another player is
irrational, or he might not know either the rationality or the irrationality of the other player. We
do not consider this third possibility here—the state of ignorance concerning rationality. We only
examine the consequences of knowing a player will act irrationally.
To make the discussion concrete, I now examine the Centipede game under the assumption that
one of the players is irrational—that is, always makes irrational moves.
6.2 Centipede Again
Figure 4 displayed a five move version of Centipede. A bigger game is more illustrative for present
purposes, so a nine move version is shown in Figure 12.
u u u u u u u u u- - - - - - - - -
?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
A8 B7 A6 B5 A4 B3 A2 B1 A0
2, 1 1, 4 4, 3 3, 6 6, 5 5, 8 8, 7 7, 10 10, 9
9, 12
Figure 12: Nine Move Centipede
For the game tree of Figure 12 our epistemic conditions, stated informally, are these: assume
the terminal node player, A, plays irrationally throughout, while the other player plays rationally.
(If the rationality and irrationality of the two players is reversed things are essentially the same,
except that we are ‘off by one.’ I leave this to the reader to work out.) It is irrelevant whether the
final player is called A or B—A is chosen to make things definite. In the figure I have displayed
information about which player is to move at each game state, and I have numbered these states.
The numbering starts from the end, rather than from the beginning as is more usual. This simplifies
the discussion somewhat. We write A0 above the terminal state, for example, to indicate that A is
to play, and it is state number 0.
Given our epistemic assumptions, one can reason informally as follows. If the game were to
start at state 0 the best move for A would be down, but since A plays irrationally, A would play
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right. At state 1, B should be able to duplicate our reasoning and so would know that the best
move for it would be right, and being rational, B would move right at state 1. At state 2, A can
also reason as we just did, and so would know that B would move right at state 1, and so would
know that its best move is right. But playing irrationally, A would move down at state 2. And
so on. This generates the following table, indicating the moves that would be made if the game
were to start at various nodes, given our epistemic assumptions about rationality. The task is to











Figure 13: Nine Move Centipede Play
We conclude this section by setting up our goal, which is to state and prove a formal embodiment
of Table 13. In subsequent sections we will add appropriate axioms that will enable us to reach
this goal.
An inspection of the informal reasoning above shows that things repeat in patterns of 4. For
instance, the move will be right at node 0, 4, 8, . . . . We are at node 0, which is terminal, if we
have [R]⊥. We are at node 4 if we have 〈R;R;R;R〉[R]⊥, or more compactly 〈R4〉[R]⊥, and so on.
Most generally, when we have 〈(R4)∗〉[R]⊥ the move should be right. At nodes 2, 6, . . . the move
should be down, and we can express this by asserting that when we have 〈R;R〉〈(R4)∗〉[R]⊥ the
move should be down. And similarly for the other two general cases. This leads us to the following
convenient abbreviations. (We write R4∗ in place of the more cluttered (R4)∗.)
F0 = 〈R4∗〉[R]⊥ ⊃ ri
F1 = 〈R〉〈R4∗〉[R]⊥ ⊃ ri
F2 = 〈R;R〉〈R4∗〉[R]⊥ ⊃ do
F3 = 〈R;R;R〉〈R4∗〉[R]⊥ ⊃ do
F = F0 ∧ F1 ∧ F2 ∧ F3
Also we adopt the following.
ra′ = ¬raA ∧ raB
Our goal is to show, formally, that from appropriate assumptions concerning Centipede, and
player rationality, there is a proof of the following, analogous to our earlier Theorem 4.5.
Cra′ ⊃ CF
And just as we did earlier, we will use Backward Induction in the formulation of Theorem 3.3.
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6.3 Beginning Formalization
Axioms RPcent-A and RPcent-B assert that rationality persists in the Centipede game. I now add
axioms saying a similar thing about irrationality, in effect positing that it is players who are rational
or irrational because they always make rational, or irrational, moves. Of course these assumptions
could be modified for other examples. One could consider a player whose rationality varies, but
the present example is complicated enough for now.
IPcent-A ¬raA ⊃ [R]¬raA
IPcent-B ¬raB ⊃ [R]¬raB
The irrationality conditions IC-A and IC-B specialize to Centipede as follows, taking KGcent-7
and KGcent-8 into account.
ICcent-A (A ∧KAkbestA(do) ∧ ¬raA) ⊃ ri
(A ∧KAkbestA(ri) ∧ ¬raA) ⊃ do
ICcent-B (B ∧KBkbestB(do) ∧ ¬raB) ⊃ ri
(B ∧KBkbestB(ri) ∧ ¬raB) ⊃ do
As noted earlier, A plays last, that is, has the turn at the terminal node if it is reached. This is
not really necessary because one could formalize things in terms of the player who plays last, but it
would make things unnecessarily complicated. I simply postulate the following special condition.
Last-A [R]⊥ ⊃ A
Backwards Induction will be used to prove Cra′ ⊃ CF . Since we already have item 1 from
Theorem 3.3, it is one of our axioms, we just need the other two, and of these, the first is obtainable
now without any further assumptions.
Proposition 6.1 (Backwards Induction, Base Case) Given the basic assumptions thus far,
[R]⊥ ⊃ (Cra′ ⊃ CF ).
Proof It is enough to show [R]⊥ ⊃ (Cra′ ⊃ CFi) for i = 0, 1, 2, 3. To show the i = 0 case we will first
show [R]⊥ ⊃ (¬raA ⊃ ri). To show the i = 1, 2, 3 cases we will first show [R]⊥ ⊃ ¬〈Ri〉〈R4∗〉[R]⊥.
The proofs are presented in some detail, though they are all essentially straightforward.
1. [R]⊥ ⊃ (¬raA ⊃ ri). Proof:
([R]⊥ ∧A) ⊃ kbestA(do) EScent-A
[R]⊥ ⊃ kbestA(do) Last-A
KA[R]⊥ ⊃ KAkbestA(do)
[R]⊥ ⊃ KAkbestA(do) KGcent-11
[R]⊥ ⊃ (A ∧KAkbestA(do)) Last-A
([R]⊥ ∧ ¬raA) ⊃ (A ∧KAkbestA(do) ∧ ¬raA)
⊃ ri ICcent-A
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2. [R]⊥ ⊃ (Cra′ ⊃ CF0). Proof:
[R]⊥ ⊃ (¬raA ⊃ ri) part 1
[R]⊥ ⊃ (¬raA ⊃ F0)
C [R]⊥ ⊃ (C¬raA ⊃ CF0)
C [R]⊥ ⊃ (Cra′ ⊃ CF0)
[R]⊥ ⊃ (Cra′ ⊃ CF0) using KGcent-11 and KGcent-12
3. [R]⊥ ⊃ ¬〈Ri〉〈R4∗〉[R]⊥ for i = 1, 2, 3. Proof: Assume i is 1, 2, or 3.




4. [R]⊥ ⊃ Fi for i = 1, 2, 3. Proof: Assume i is 1, 2, or 3.
[R]⊥ ⊃ ¬〈Ri〉〈R4∗〉[R]⊥ part 3
⊃ Fi
⊃ (ra′ ⊃ Fi)
C[R]⊥ ⊃ (Cra′ ⊃ CFi)
[R]⊥ ⊃ (Cra′ ⊃ CFi) using KGcent-11 and KGcent-12
We now have part of what we need for an application of Backwards Induction. To get the rest
we need more information about the structure of augmented game trees for Centipede. We take
this up in the next section.
6.4 Additional Structural Assumptions
In Section 4.2 axioms were given embodying structural information about the Centipede game,
KGcent-1 – KGcent-6, identical to KG-1 – KG-6, and KGcent-7 – KGcent-15, but they are not
complete. In this section more assumptions are proposed. They are stated semantically since they
seem difficult to properly capture in axioms. They do, however, lead to a formula we can use to
complete our discussion of Centipede with an irrational player.
The game tree for Centipede is obviously linear, so each move to the right takes us from a game
state to a unique “next” state. The game is one of perfect information, so there is no ambiguity as
to which state we are in. This should be reflected from the game tree to augmented game trees for
Centipede, where epistemic states within game states are shown.
Linearity Assumption: Suppose there is an R transition from an epistemic state e in Centipede game
state g1 to some epistemic state in game state g2. Then every R transition from e must be to an
epistemic state of g2.
The next assumption roughly says that different epistemic states in the same game state should
be capable of having some affect on each other. There should be no isolated epistemic states. I
propose this as a useful assumption, but admit it needs more thought and exploration.
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Reachability Assumption: Suppose g is a Centipede game state and e1 and e2 are two different
epistemic states of g. Then e2 is reachable from e1 via a path of epistemic states in which each is
accessible from its predecessor either via the accessibility relation for player A or the accessibility
relation for player B.
Notice that both of these assumptions hold in the diagram of Figure 11.
The Reachability Assumption provides a solution to a minor lacuna that we have so far avoided
discussing. We have been making tacit assumptions about terminal nodes in our informal discus-
sions, though this has had no affect on our axiomatic arguments. We have characterized terminal
nodes by the truth of [R]⊥, but truth where? A game state might contain many epistemic states—
could [R]⊥ be true at some while false at others. The Reachability Assumption rules this out.
Suppose some epistemic state e of a game state has [R]⊥ true at it. It follows from KGcent-11 and
KGcent-12 that [R]⊥ is common knowledge at e. The state e might not be accessible from itself,
we might not have Factivity, but every other state will be reachable, and then CK-1 implies [R]⊥
will be true at every other state. Of course we began with the assumption that [R]⊥ was true at
e, and hence [R]⊥ is true at every epistemic state of the game node. In short, if the Reachability
Assumption is assumed, then if [R]⊥ is true at any epistemic state of a game state, it is true at all
of them, and so any ambiguity about being a terminal node is bypassed.
There is one more important consequence of these semantic assumptions, one that can be
formulated succinctly, and which we will adopt as an additional Centipede axiom. Accept the
Linearity Assumption and the Reachability Assumption. Suppose 〈R〉CX is true at some epistemic
state, e, of a game state g1. Then there must be an R transition to an epistemic state of some
game node g2, at which CX is true. Using the Reachability Assumption and CK-1, CX must be true
at every epistemic state of g2. Using the Linearity Assumption, every R transition from e must be
to an epistemic state of g2, hence to an epistemic state at which CX is true. It follows that [R]CX
is true at e. We have shown that the assumptions above imply the validity of 〈R〉CX ⊃ [R]CX,
and we will make this our final Centipede axiom.
Lin + Reach 〈R〉CX ⊃ [R]CX
We note again, the Reachability Assumption and the Linearity Assumption together imply Lin +
Reach.
6.5 The Irrational Player Concluded
By making use of the additional assumptions discussed in the previous section, or rather of their
consequence, we can complete our proof of Cra′ ⊃ CF , where ra′ and F were defined in Section 6.2.
We do this by applying the Backwards Induction scheme, Theorem 3.3. The base case has already
been shown, in Proposition 6.1. We have yet to show the induction step, but before doing this it
will simplify things to get a few easy items out of the way first.
Our first preliminary item says that where we are in the game determines whose move it is. This
is not surprising. The point is that it does follow from our axioms, hence is common knowledge,
and can be used in our proofs. It says A moves at even positions, and B moves at odd ones.
Lemma 6.2
1. 〈R2∗〉[R]⊥ ⊃ A
2. 〈R〉〈R2∗〉[R]⊥ ⊃ B
28 Melvin Fitting
Proof By KG-9 and KG-10, A ⊃ [R]B and B ⊃ [R]A, so B ⊃ [R2]B. Then by the induction rule
PDL-8, B ⊃ [R2∗]B. By Last-A, [R]⊥ ⊃ A, so using KG-1 and KG-2, B ⊃ 〈R〉>. Combining results,
B ⊃ [R2∗]〈R〉>, and hence 〈R2∗〉[R]⊥ ⊃ A.
Since A ⊃ [R]B, 〈R〉A ⊃ B follows using KG-1 and KG-2. Then part 2 follows immediately
from part 1.
The second preliminary result says that common knowledge of the status of player rationality
is preserved under a game move.
Lemma 6.3 Assume No Learning, PDLE-1. Then Cra′ ⊃ [R]Cra′.
Proof Using IPcent-A and RPcent-A,
ra′ ≡ (¬raA ∧ raB)
⊃ ([R]¬raA ∧ [R]raB)
⊃ [R]ra′
Then, using Proposition 2.2,
Cra′ ⊃ C[R]ra′
⊃ [R]Cra′
The final preliminary item allows us to simplify the formulas F0, F1, F2, and F3 that make up
the formula F .
Lemma 6.4 Assume No Learning, PDLE-1 and Reasoning Ability, PDLE-3. Then:
1. 〈Rn〉[R]⊥ ⊃ C〈Rn〉[R]⊥,
2. [Rn]〈R〉> ⊃ C[Rn]〈R〉>,
3. C[〈Rn〉[R]⊥ ⊃ X] ≡ [〈Rn〉[R]⊥ ⊃ CX].
Proof
1. Using KGcent-11 and KGcent-12, [R]⊥ ⊃ C[R]⊥. Then 〈Rn〉[R]⊥ ⊃ 〈Rn〉C[R]⊥, and the result
follows using Proposition 2.1.
2. > ⊃ C>, so 〈Rn〉> ⊃ 〈Rn〉C>. By Proposition 2.1 again, 〈Rn〉> ⊃ C〈Rn〉>, and so
[R]〈Rn〉> ⊃ [R]C〈Rn〉>. The result follows using Proposition 2.2.
3. The implication from left to right follows by distributing C across the implication, and then
using part 1 of this Lemma. For the implication from right to left, we reason as follows.
[〈Rn〉[R]⊥ ⊃ CX] ⊃ [¬〈Rn〉[R]⊥ ∨ CX]
⊃ [[Rn]〈R〉> ∨ CX]
⊃ [C[Rn]〈R〉> ∨ CX]
⊃ [C¬〈Rn〉[R]⊥ ∨ CX]
⊃ C[〈Rn〉[R]⊥ ⊃ X]
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Now we are ready for the remaining part of our backwards induction argument. The argument
looks long, but the overall structure is rather simple.
Proposition 6.5 (Backwards Induction, Induction Step) Assume No Learning, PDLE-1, Rea-
soning Ability, PDLE-3, and Lin + Reach. Then 〈R〉[Cra′ ⊃ CF ] ⊃ [Cra′ ⊃ CF ].
Proof Essentially, the argument divides into four cases, based on the following.
{〈R〉[Cra′ ⊃ CF ] ∧ Cra′} ⊃ {〈R〉[Cra′ ⊃ CF ] ∧ [R]Cra′} Lemma 6.3
⊃ 〈R〉CF
⊃ 〈R〉C{F0 ∧ F1 ∧ F2 ∧ F3}
⊃ 〈R〉{CF0 ∧ CF1 ∧ CF2 ∧ CF3}
⊃ {〈R〉CF0 ∧ 〈R〉CF1 ∧ 〈R〉CF2 ∧ 〈R〉CF3}
⊃ {[R]CF0 ∧ [R]CF1 ∧ [R]CF2 ∧ [R]CF3} Lin + Reach
We will prove each of the following.
1. {Cra′ ∧ [R]CF0} ⊃ CF1
2. {Cra′ ∧ [R]CF1} ⊃ CF2
3. {Cra′ ∧ [R]CF2} ⊃ CF3
4. {Cra′ ∧ [R]CF3} ⊃ CF0
Once this is shown, by combining this with the result above we are finished, as follows.
{〈R〉[Cra′ ⊃ CF ] ∧ Cra′} ⊃ {[R]CF0 ∧ [R]CF1 ∧ [R]CF2 ∧ [R]CF3}
⊃ {CF1 ∧ CF2 ∧ CF3 ∧ CF0}
⊃ C{F1 ∧ F2 ∧ F3 ∧ F0}
⊃ CF
Of the four numbered items, we only show 1 and 4, which have proofs that differ in details.
The other two have proofs similar to the ones we show. We begin with item 1. Using Lemma 6.4








and it is in this form that we will prove it. In this argument and the next, we make use of the












































































































Finally we establish item 4, which has a complication unique to this case. As in the proof of
item 1, we use Lemma 6.4 part 3 and convert item 4 into the following equivalent version, which








Generally in PDL, 〈α∗〉X ≡ [X∨〈α〉〈α∗〉X], so in in particular, 〈R4∗〉[R]⊥ ≡ [[R]⊥∨〈R4〉〈R4∗〉[R]⊥].
















Of these, (3) follows easily from Proposition 6.1, and we omit details. Here is the argument for



















































































and the proof of this is essentially the same as one given at the end of the argument for item 1.
This finishes the proof of item 4, and concludes the overall argument.
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We have everything we need to get the promised result for Centipede with an irrational player.
Theorem 6.6 Assume No Learning, PDLE-1, Reasoning Ability, PDLE-3, and Lin + Reach.
Cra′ ⊃ CF
Proof As we have said several times along the way, this is by an application of the Backwards
Induction Scheme, Theorem 3.3. Of the three hypotheses in that, item 1 is an axiom, KGcent-15.
Item 2 is Proposition 6.1. And item 3 is Proposition 6.5 above.
7 Conclusion
The Centipede analysis strongly suggests that PDL + E is a natural tool for reasoning about games
in which an epistemic component is central. The paper [20] makes the same point. As has been
seen, PDL + E machinery provides the flexibility to establish derivability, and non-derivability, of
various statements—there is both a proof theory and a model theory. Nonetheless, much more
remains to be done.
Completeness has not been essential here. This does not mean it is without interest, but since
we have been concerned with specific games, it is not entirely clear what completeness should
mean. Perhaps it is best to break the issue into smaller pieces. For example, can one characterize,
semantically or syntactically, games of perfect information? After all, game history is not part of
the formalisim.
The structural assumptions introduced semantically in Section 6.4 need further thought. What
is a/the natural way of capturing them proof-theoretically? Are they required in full strength, or
will something weaker do for most purposes? In particular, what is the status of Lin + Reach? The
Reachability Assumption, in particular, needs thought. As stated, it does not rule out reachability
stretching beyond the epistemic states of a single game state. Indeed, in [20] this was done in
order to model games that are not perfect information, in particular, where a player does not know
exactly which game node he or she might be at. To what extent do we want to assume, and to
what extent do we want to restrict reachability.
We need more examples involving other games, worked through using PDL + E machinery.
Certainly the strategy assumptions MScent-A, MScent-B, EScent-A, EScent-B would need to be
replaced with other conditions appropriate to other games, as would Lin + Reach, and this is partly
why completeness issues remain a sideline. The general assumptions introduced in Section 3 are
likely to survive for a range of games. Then there is the matter of the interaction conditions, No
Learning, PDLE-1, Perfect Recall, PDLE-2, and Reasoning Ability, PDLE-3. To what extent do we
want these? Reasoning Ability, 〈R〉KX ⊃ K〈R〉X, is a case in point. It seems improbable that
we would want 〈α〉KX ⊃ K〈α〉X to be a general logical principle for any action α because, for
instance, it might be true that after conducting a certain experiment we will know the truth of
some scientific fact, but we might not know that this is the experiment we need to carry out.
On the other hand Perfect Recall, K[R]X ⊃ [R]KX, seems a plausible candidate to generalize,
K[α]X ⊃ [α]KX, though it would not be so if the knowledge operator were replaced with a belief
operator. The logic must be tailored to the situation.
There is also the issue of common knowledge in general. It is bothersome that Extended Perfect
Recall, CK-3, needed to be assumed. What, exactly, is its status?
What about a practical proof procedure for PDL+E, an issue that partly depends on what can be
done with tableau procedures for PDL itself, as well as tableau procedures for common knowledge.
It may be that an interactive system would be helpful, in which straightforward tableau rules
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take care of most things, while the user suggests appropriate induction formulas to guide it in the
applications of the ∗ or the C operator. At any rate, a start has already been made in [14].
Finally, Justification logics, [2, 3], have developed into an important field of research. These
are epistemic logics in which, instead of simple knowledge or belief operators, there is machinery
to express reasons for particular items of knowledge. There are operations on these reasons, but so
far the operations investigated have been motivated by formal proofs in modal logic. The various
cross axioms of Section 2.3 suggest there may be other operations on justifications, arising in a
combined dynamic-epistemic context. Investigating this would be a long-term project, but one of
considerable interest.
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